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something can be just but nonetheless morally impermissible. For brevity, we shall often write of actions being permissible or agents having a moral liberty, but this should always be understood in the interpersonal sense of violating no one's rights.
Libertarianism is sometimes advocated as a derivative set of rules (e.g., derived from rule utilitarian or contractarian doctrines). Here, however, we reserve the term for the natural rights doctrine that agents initially fully own themselves. Agents are full self-owners just in case they own themselves in precisely the same way that they can fully own inanimate objects. Stated slightly differently, full self-owners own themselves in the same way that a full chattel-slaveowner owns a slave. Throughout, we are concerned with moral ownership and not legal ownership. We are concerned, that is, with moral rights to control the use of resources and related rights rather than the rights that some legal system creates.
Full self-ownership consists of full private ownership of one's person (e.g., body). Full private ownership of an object consists of a full set of the following ownership rights: (1) control rights over the use of the object (liberty-rights to use it and claim-rights against others using it), (2) rights to transfer any of these rights to others (powers of sale, rental, gift, or loan), (3) rights to compensation if someone uses the object without one's permission, (4) enforcement rights (rights to use force to prevent the violation of these rights or to extract compensation owed for past violation), and (5) immunities against the non-consensual loss of these rights. 1 All forms of libertarianism endorse full self-ownership. They differ with respect to the liberties persons have to use, or the moral powers they have to acquire ownership of, natural resources (and perhaps other resources). In the narrow sense, natural resources are all the resources in the world, in their unimproved form, that were not created by any (non-divine) agent. Natural resources (land, air, water, space, etc.) are contrasted with artifacts (improvements 3 to natural resources, such as improvement to soil or constructions of chairs) and with beings with moral standing (which we, for simplicity, assume to be agents). Libertarians assume that agents initially fully own themselves and that, when they own all the factors of production, they initially fully own the artifacts that they produce. The core issue for libertarianism concerns how unowned resources can come to be privately owned. More exactly, the core issue concerns how natural resources and abandoned artifacts (artifacts over which no one claims ownership; e.g., the estate of a monk who renounces all rights to earthly possessions) can come to be privately owned. For brevity, in what follows, natural resources should be understood as including any abandoned artifacts.
The best-known versions of libertarianism are right-libertarian theories, which hold that natural resources are initially unowned and that agents have a robust moral power to acquire full private ownership of unowned things. Left-libertarians, by contrast, hold that natural resources (e.g., space, land, minerals, air, and water) belong to all individuals in some egalitarian manner and thus, for example, cannot be privately appropriated without their consent or significant compensatory payment to them.
2 On this view, natural resources are initially unowned in the sense that no one's permission is needed to use or appropriate them, but they 'belong' to all in some egalitarian manner in the sense that those who appropriate (and perhaps those who use) natural resources owe a compensatory payment to those who are left with less than their egalitarian share of the value of natural resources. 3 We here assume that some form of libertarianism is correct and focus on identifying the most plausible version and its implications for intergenerational justice.
There is a version of left-libertarianism, joint-ownership left-libertarianism, which holds that natural resources belong to everyone collectively (rather than severally and equally) and thus that private appropriation-and perhaps, much more radically, even use-requires collective consent of some sort (e.g., majority or unanimity). Because it allows no appropriation without the consent of others, it is not a very plausible form of libertarianism: it is doubtful that selfownership can have much meaning under conditions where each person's access to natural resources requires collective consent. This problem is particularly acute in the case of multiple generations, where it is strictly impossible to obtain the consent of non-concurrent individuals.
For simplicity, we shall therefore set joint-ownership left-libertarianism aside. We shall thus focus on unilateralist versions of libertarianism, which hold that agents are permitted to use, and have a moral power to appropriate, unowned resources without anyone else's consent-but perhaps conditional upon making a compensatory payment to others.
Almost all unilateralist libertarian theories are Lockean in that they allow unilateral appropriation only on the condition that 'enough and as good' be left for others. 4 As we shall see below, there are several ways of interpreting this proviso. There is, however, one unilateralist theory, radical right-libertarianism that imposes no proviso on appropriation. It holds that individuals have the power to appropriate unowned things unilaterally simply by claiming them (or mixing-labor with them, etc.). They deny that any further conditions are relevant. 5 Radical right-libertarianism is, we believe, implausible. It holds that there is no injustice in one person destroying the world prior to appropriation by others, nor in appropriating the entire world and leaving everyone else in a miserable situation. In any case, it is clear that, according to radical right-libertarianism, there are no issues of intergenerational justice in the distribution of opportunities to use resources-which is the focus of this paper-and we shall therefore set it
aside.
In what follows, then, we shall focus on Lockean libertarianism, which, as we shall see, comes in both left-and right-libertarian versions. Traditionally, the distinction between the two has been drawn in terms of a difference in their respective limits on powers to appropriate unowned resources (i.e., acquire rights over previously unowned things). It has been generally assumed that everyone is initially free to use unowned resources as they please (as long, of course, as they do not violate the self-ownership, or other established property rights, of others).
Under certain assumptions, to be detailed below, this now seems to us to be a mistake (although we have both endorsed this view until now). One can use a resource (e.g., stand on some land)
without appropriating it and, we shall now suggest, a proviso is needed on permissible use in addition to one on powers of appropriation. Given that this will be relevant for our discussion of intergenerational justice, we shall address this point here.
Consider an agent in a densely populated world who claims no private property rights over any natural resources, but goes around systematically destroying or radically degrading them on a massive scale. Given that there is no appropriation, standard accounts of Lockean libertarianism would see no injustice here, but we believe that this is a mistake. The core issue of importance is not merely when agents may appropriate resources; it also concerns issues of permissible use. One person's use of natural resources-even without appropriation-must be compatible with some kind of fair opportunity for others to use.
The need for a proviso on permissible use-and not merely on powers of appropriationhas been recognized and defended by Eric Mack (1995) . 6 For example, in one of his many insightful cases, a group of people, without engaging in appropriation, form a human circle around another without touching her. This encircling makes it impossible for that person to move without infringing the self-ownership of the encirclers. Thus, if the encirclers are using resources (e.g., the land they are standing on) permissibly-and thus forfeiting none of their self-ownership 6 rights for wrongful action-the encircled person is not permitted to move about. This implausible result leads Mack to endorse a proviso on permissible use of external resources.
Roughly, it prohibits actions that severely disable another person's 'world interactive powers'.
We fully agree that some such proviso is needed (although, as will become apparent below, we would reject the particular proviso that he defends). There is, of course, an analogous issue about whether dead people have rights. The standard choice-protecting view denies that they have rights because they no longer have any capacity for choice. 12 The interest-protecting and choice-prioritizing views could also deny that they have rights on the ground that they not now have the potential for experience (whereas future people do now have that potential). Although this is a somewhat controversial issue, for simplicity, we shall assume (as we each believe) that dead people have no rights. 13 We shall thus focus our attention on intergenerational duties of the current generation to future generations.
Our Core Case
We are now ready to begin our examination of the implications of Lockean libertarianism for intergenerational justice. We shall focus on the justice of the distribution of rights over external (natural and artifactual) resources, and we shall set aside injustices that arise from the violation of self-ownership. All forms of libertarianism agree that a violation of self-ownership is unjust.
Thus, if future people will have rights of self-ownership, and setting a time-bomb now will, at some later date, but with certainty, kill them (and thus violate their self-ownership), then this counts as a form of intergenerational injustice. In what follows, however, we focus solely on the distribution of rights over external resources.
Throughout, we shall assume that generations are defined in the very strict sense as maximal sets of individuals born exactly at the same time. Obviously, in practice, looser definitions may be useful, but for present purposes it will simplify matters if all members of a given generation can be assumed to be born at exactly the same time.
Throughout, for simplicity, we shall assume that the only beings that have rights are agents (i.e., psychologically autonomous beings) who pop into existence without going through pre-agency childhood. Moreover, we assume that there is no uncertainty about what people will exist or how their interests will be affected, if a given action is performed. Obviously, these assumptions side-step very important issues relevant to a theory of intergenerational justice.
Dealing with the core issues is sufficiently complex, however, even with these simplifying assumptions.
We shall start with an extremely simple case and then serially introduce additional complexities. More exactly, we shall start with the core case, which is one where
(1) Agents take no interest in other agents and thus there are no gifts or bequests.
(2) There is no procreation: individuals come into existence by natural forces and thus no agent bears any causal responsibility for the existence of other agents.
(3) There is a fixed natural number-assumed, for simplicity, to be two or three (depending on the example)-of non-overlapping generations.
(4) All generations have the same number of agents.
What constraints might a Lockean libertarian place on use and/or appropriation of unowned resources? As indicated above, we believe that some constraints must be placed on use-and not merely on appropriation. Suppose, for example, that the members of the first generation appropriate no resources, but destroy or radically degrade almost all natural resources (e.g., through massive pollution and radical deforestation)-with the net effect that members of the second generation are left with miserable, and much worse, opportunities to use natural resources. Standard versions of Lockean libertarianism-even left-libertarian versions-see no injustice in this, since no one has appropriated more than her fair share. We believe that this is implausible. Some constraints on permissible use are needed.
A Lockean proviso on use and appropriation requires, in some loose sense, that 'enough and as good' be left for others. There are different ways of making this more precise, but the standard approach, followed here, is to require that the value of the initial opportunities to use resources that are left for others be high enough. There are three main ways of doing this. One focuses solely on the initial opportunities to use natural resources. 14 A second focuses, more inclusively, on the initial opportunities to use external (natural and artifactual) resources (i.e., all resources other than the internal resources of one's person). 15 The third focuses, still more inclusively, on the initial opportunities to use all (natural, artifactual, and internal) resources. 16 Although this third approach takes internal endowments (i.e., the resources that are constitutive of persons) into account when evaluating the relevant initial opportunities, it, like the first two, holds that agents fully own themselves. A person with malfunctioning kidneys has a greater entitlement to external resources, but she has no entitlement to anyone's kidney. The exact significance of the differences between these three versions will become clearer below when we discuss gifts. For the sake of generality, we formulate the proviso so as to be compatible with any of the three versions. For simplicity, however, we shall tend to focus on the narrow natural resource interpretation.
Let us start by considering a weak version of the Lockean proviso. It appeals to the idea of a 'decent' share of opportunities to use natural resources. There are many possible criteria of decency that might be invoked, but the core idea is that a decent share enables individuals to have some minimally adequate or sufficient quality of life. For example, it might ensure that they can satisfy all their basic needs. Consider, then:
Decent Share Proviso: An agent has a presumptive moral liberty to use, and has the moral power to appropriate, an unowned resource if and only if this (1) gives her no more than decent initial (lifetime) opportunities to use natural resources, or (2) adversely affects no other agent who is left with less than decent initial (lifetime) opportunities to use natural/external/all resources.
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Here and throughout, an agent, A, has presumptive moral liberty to use an object just in case no one has a claim right over the object that A not use it. For example, others do not have a presumptive moral liberty to use the car that I own (because of my claim rights over it), but I have a presumptive moral liberty to use that car (because no one has a claim right that I not use it). A presumptive moral liberty to use an object merely establishes that using it without anyone's consent does not necessarily violate anyone's claim rights. Of course, many uses of the object 13 will violate the claim rights of others (as when I violate your self-ownership by hitting you with my car).
The proviso above and those below should be understood as satisfied when a person uses (or appropriates) more than the specified share of the specified resources but offsets the consequent disadvantage to others by leaving enough other resources for them to use.
We believe that, at least if the threshold for decent opportunities is set low enough (e.g., at the level needed for a life worth living), the Decent Share Proviso is correct in the necessary condition that it imposes. We believe, however, that this condition is not a sufficient condition for permissible use or appropriation. Suppose, for example, that natural resources are bountiful enough to give everyone a wonderful life and one person radically devastates them but leaves enough for each person to have a decent life. We believe that such use is not permissible. Natural resources belong to all of us in some egalitarian manner, and such a person is using more than her fair share.
Consider, then:
Egalitarian Proviso: An agent has a presumptive moral liberty to use, and a moral power to appropriate, an unowned resource if and only if this adversely affects no one who is left with less than an equally valuable initial (lifetime) opportunities to use natural/external/all resources. 18, 19 We believe that something in the general area of this proviso is plausible, but we shall not attempt a full defense here. 20 The core point is simply that natural resources, by definition, were not created by any human agent, and thus it is plausible that everyone has some kind of equal claim to having an opportunity to use them. This also seems true of abandoned artifacts (e.g., 
Generations of Different Sizes
Let us now relax the assumption that each generation has the same number of agents-but continue, for simplicity, to focus on the case where there are just two generations. For concreteness, suppose that the first generation has 10 people and the second generation has 20.
Suppose that the first generation uses up half of the value of natural resources and leaves no offsetting artifacts. Is this just?
One view-tentatively endorsed by Gosseries (2001: 311) One significant change is that, when there is overlap, the choice-protecting conception recognizes duties of intergenerational justice. When there is no overlap, it arguably does not recognize any such duties because the members of the subsequent generation do not exist at any time at which the members of the current generation perform actions. When there is overlap, however, then members of the subsequent generation exist, with rights, at the time of action of members of the first generation. Thus, the fact of overlap makes a very significant difference on the choice-protecting conception of rights.
The implications of the choice-prioritizing conception and the interest-protecting conception, however, are not affected, since they can recognize duties of intergenerational justice even when there is no overlap. For these conceptions, overlap requires no change in principles, but it does introduce two important changes in empirical implications.
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The empirical implications concern ownership rights. When there was no overlap, the agents of the first generation could fully appropriate natural resources. They merely had to ensure that, at death, the value of the natural resources and artifacts that each left for each member of the next generation was at least as great as the per capita value of the natural resources that had been initially available to each of them. However, when generations overlap, the equal entitlements of the second-generation members take effect prior to the death of the members of the first generation. Thus, although there is no problem (as in the non-overlap case)
with the first generation initially appropriating all natural resources, their ownership of these natural resources is not unconditional. When the second generation comes into existence, the members of the first generation may lose some of their rights over resources-if they are now disadvantaging someone by taking more than their per capita share. More specifically, if there are n members of the first generation and m members of the second generation, and the initial value of natural (and abandoned artifactual) resources was V, then each member of the first generation must relinquish rights over (natural or artifactual) resources to the extent that their rights over natural resources exceed the value V/(n+m). Suppose, for example, that the initial value of natural resources was 90 units, that there were 10 members of the first generation, and that there are 20 members in the second generation. Prior to the arrival of the second generation, each member of the first generation could appropriate natural resources worth up to 9 (90/10) units without the need to compensate others (as long as they do not degrade those resources).
Once the second generation arrives, however, compensation is then required from those who have appropriated natural resources in excess of 3 (90/30) units of value.
In short, when generations overlap, the fair shares for the purposes of appropriation are recalculated when new right-bearing individuals come into existence, and individuals with 20 excess shares must relinquish them or provide compensation. The new fair share is no different from that which they would have to leave at their death in the case of non-overlap (on the assumption that future individuals have rights). The only difference is that it must be provided during the agents' lifetimes when new individuals come into existence.
The second important empirical implication that arises where generations overlap is that there is the opportunity for members of different generations to cooperate in mutually beneficial ways. Where the generations do not overlap, first generation individuals have no incentive to leave more than the required minimum share of natural resources for the later generation. With overlapping generations, however, agreements can be made that make both parties better off and have the effect of enhancing the likelihood that artifactual wealth is passed on to later generations. For example, it might be that, for a given generation, the costs of their limiting global warming outweigh the benefits, but that (given the positive externalities of such limitation), for the totality of overlapping generations at a given time, the benefits of their limiting global warming outweigh the costs. Each generation will therefore have an incentive to limit global warming if overlapping generations also do so. The net effect over time of such limitation is that later generations will benefit from the limitations of much earlier nonoverlapping generations.
Procreation
So far, we have been assuming that there is no uncertainty about who will exist. Moreover, we have also been assuming that agents come into existence simply as the result of deterministic natural forces and without any role for the choices of other agents: agents are not procreated.
Things become very complex when there is indeterminacy about who will exist, and it is beyond the scope of this paper to address this issue generally. Instead, we shall now introduce only an extremely limited-and highly artificial-form of indeterminism about who will exist. We shall assume that there is one person who has one opportunity to add one additional person to the world by making an appropriate procreative choice (as well as the opportunity not to do so).
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For simplicity, we shall, however, continue to assume that agents pop into existence fully formed (without first going through non-autonomous phases whether it falls to the members of society generally. We assume that, at a minimum, the members of society owe this duty to the offspring to the extent that it is not possible for the parents to provide the fair share (e.g., because they are dead or too poor). Individuals, that is, do not lose their right to their fair share of resources simply because their procreators fail to provide it. The core question, then, is whether the duty to provide the fair share falls in the first instance to the parents or to the members of society.
The argument in favor of the view that procreators-rather than members of society in Where an individual intentionally procreates, however, she is responsible for the existence of procreated being and is thus accountable for providing the same share to her as the share of other individuals.
We conclude that it is procreators who have the duty, in the first instance, to provide the fair share to their intentionally created offspring. 27 The rights of offspring to their fair share are, however, also held against all the pre-existing people. The latter have the duty to provide the fair share, if (but only if) procreators cannot be made to do so.
Gifts and Bequests
So far, we have assumed that agents take no interest in each other and thus make no giftswhether they be bequests (gifts from dead people) or inter vivos gifts. We shall now relax this assumption. The question is whether a plausible form of left-libertarianism will place restrictions 24 on gift-giving in order to reduce its disruptive effects on initial equality of opportunity. Although this issue arises even within a given generation, it is particularly acute when there are gifts between generations.
As background, we note that no plausible version of left-libertarianism (or any theory of justice) will prohibit, as a matter of public policy, gift-giving outright. Gift-giving is something that most people find intrinsically valuable (e.g., birthday gifts to children). Prohibiting gifts outright would not only deprive almost everyone of this benefit, it would also significantly reduce the incentive for individuals to accumulate wealth and leave it for the benefit for others. If legal restrictions are placed on gift-giving, they will take the form of a tax liability and not a prohibition. Moreover, the tax liability will be only for gifts that disrupt initial equality of opportunity. Thus, for example, gifts to a person who has less than average initial opportunity will not generate a tax liability. Finally, the enforced tax rate will typically be less than 100%, for it will be set at a rate that will maximally benefit those who have less than equal initial opportunities. It might be set, for example, at a rate that will maximize tax revenues from gift taxation. (This is normally not 100%, since such a rate provides no incentive to accumulate wealth and make gifts.)
Let us start by addressing bequests. Bequests in the strict sense are gifts from dead people. Because dead people have no rights, there is no right to make bequests. This is straightforward on a choice-protecting conception of rights, since dead people no longer have the capacity to exercise their wills. It is arguably also true on the choice-prioritizing and interestprotecting conceptions. Of course, there is a clear sense in which the interests that people had prior to death can be advanced or thwarted after their death, but the question is whether this sense is relevant for justice. We claim that it is not. The only relevant interests, we claim, are those that presuppose the potential for sentience. Since dead people have no such potential, they have, we claim, no interests in the relevant sense.
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Bequests in the strict sense need to be distinguished from quasi-bequests, where these are understood as transfers of rights that take place during the lifetime of the donor, but which are conditional and temporarily delayed. A quasi-bequest has roughly the following form: I now transfer to you the conditional right of ownership over my car that takes effect when and only when I die and you are alive. Unlike genuine bequests, a quasi-bequest immediately deprives the bequeather of some of the ownership incidents they would otherwise continue to possess up to the moment of their deaths. Thus, for example, having quasi-bequeathed my car to you, I no longer have the power to sell it or the liberty to destroy it. Given that almost all real-life 'bequests' can be made to take the form of quasi-bequests, the absence of a right of bequest in the strict sense has little practical import in most cases. It does, however, have some import: any resources that agents own at the time of their death are abandoned assets and become part of the pool of natural resources (in the extended sense).
Of course, agents may still be able to transfer their assets by inter vivos gift. In the remainder of this section, then, we shall focus on inter vivos gifts. Such gifts can take place between members of the same generation, as well as between members of different, but If an agent fully owns a given resource, he is morally free to destroy it if he wishes.
Moreover, he has-as part of his full ownership of the resource-a full formal right to transfer his rights over the resource to someone else. In order for a right to be transferred to someone, however, the recipient must have the moral power to acquire the rights involved. We assume-as do all libertarians-that agents have an unrestricted moral power to acquire rights by transfer in cases where there is an exchange of rights with equal competitive value (as in typical cases of market exchange Consider now the version of the transfer proviso that considers initial opportunities to use natural resources and artifacts (i.e., all external resources). The transfer proviso does not restrict gifts of internal endowments (e.g., kidneys). Moreover, if individuals all have equally valuable initial opportunities to use external resources, it imposes no restrictions on gifts (since the initial opportunities remain equal). The transfer proviso does, however, restrict the moral power to acquire by gift, when this gives the recipient more than her per capita share of initial opportunities to use external resources (and adversely affects someone with less than her per capita share). For example, if everyone has her per capita share of natural resources and no one other than Silver Spoon starts life with any artifactual gifts, then Silver Spoon may acquire artifactual gifts only to the extent that others also do (e.g., a gift tax would tax away all but her per capita share of natural resources). In this respect, the transfer proviso functions exactly as the use and appropriation proviso (applied to external resources): one has the power to acquire up to one's per capita share, but no more (without compensating by giving up some of one's internal resources).
Finally, consider the version of the egalitarian proviso that considers initial opportunities 29 to use all resources (natural, artifactual, and internal citizen receives a share of material wealth that is equal to that of others who are roughly contemporary and no less than that received by his predecessors.´ (Ackerman, 1980: 208) . It is also roughly the view expressed in fn. 2 of Rakowski (1991: 150) . 20 We here leave open the important issue of whether the value an agent's initial opportunities to use natural resources is her total lifetime opportunity, her average opportunity per unit of time lived, or something else. We are inclined to believe that each agent should indeed have equally valuable (total lifetime) opportunities-independently of how long he/she lives, but this will play no role in the argument that follows.
21 Left-libertarianism is a form of liberal egalitarianism: its distinguishing feature is that it holds that agents are full self-owners and that this can place limits on the permissible means of achieving the relevant equality.
22 As Gosseries (2001: 306) notes, the need to include abandoned assets from previous generations is not taken into account adequately in the following passages (which may not reflect 39 the authors' considered views): '[T]he continued legitimacy of private ownership from the standpoint of self-ownership depends on each person in each successive generation obtaining the equivalent of a per capita share of unimproved, undegraded land.' (Arneson 1991: 53) . '[A]s I will argue, the egalitarian proviso, when fully spelled out, requires that the members of each succeeding generation have at least as great an opportunity to own worldly resources as did the first generation to acquire resources out of the state of nature.' (Otsuka, 1998: 88 ; he later qualifies this statement to avoid limiting attention to the first generation).
23 It should be noted that Rawls emphasizes that: 'Justice does not require that early generations save so that later ones are simply wealthier. Savings is demanded as a condition of bringing about the full realization of just institutions and the fair value of liberty.' Nonetheless, we find it implausible that justice requires the worst of members of society (viewed intergenerationally) to make a sacrifice that benefits the better off. For discussion of savings requirements from several moral perspectives, see Gosseries (2001) and Gosseries (2004: ch. 4) . 24 We do not here attempt to deal with the very important issues that arise from the non-identity problem in the context of person-affecting principles of justice. Some excellent books on this issue and population ethics generally include Roberts (1998) , Arrhenius (2000) , Broome (2004) , and Blackorby, Donaldson, and Bossert (2005) . For a view about how egalitarians should respond to the non-identity problem while endorsing a person-affecting view of morality, see Tungodden and Vallentyne (2006) . 25 For discussion of non-libertarian reasons why one might owe a duty to others to procreate, see section 2 of Meyer (2003a) . 26 Whether further transfers are warranted, from procreators who use higher-valued genetic 40 information to procreate, may depend on whether such information counts as a natural resource;
see Steiner (1994, chs. 7(B), 8) , Steiner (1997) and (1999) . 27 We here leave open the more difficult issue of non-intentionally created offspring. The view that parents have the duty to provide the fair shares to their offspring is advocated by Ackerman (1980: 200) , Rakowski (1991: 153) , Casal and Williams (2004), and Tideman (2000) . For a general discussion of the rights and duties of procreators from a quasi-libertarian perspective, see Vallentyne (2002a) . For a discussion of the rights and duties of custodial parents, see Vallentyne (2003) . 28 For an argument that there are duties owed to someone that survive that person's death (and moral standing), see Meyer (2003b) 29 Of course, not all apparent market exchanges, or even all market exchanges, involve the exchange of rights with equal competitive value. When I buy the normal apple from my niece (or from a charity) for $100, I am making a gift of the amount by which the competitive value of the apple is less than $100. 30 Gifts, which involve a transfer of rights, are distinct from favors, which involve the use of one's property to benefit others where recipient has no right to such use (e.g., my mowing your lawn or my granting you (revocable) permission to use my lawn mower). A person's full ownership of a thing (herself or some artifact) gives her the right to use it to perform favors for others, and since the beneficiary requires no special moral power to benefit from favors (since, unlike gifts, there is no transfer of rights), there is no room within libertarian theory to restrict favors. It should be noted, however, that one of us (Steiner) is uncertain whether the gift-favor distinction can invariably be drawn in such a way as to support both the claim that no special 41 power is needed to acquire rights to benefits that have been bestowed by favors, and the claim that such a power is needed to acquire rights transferred by gift. Particularly problematic, in this regard, are bestowals of personal services, e.g. a dental treatment or a shoeshine. 31 We here rely on our assumption that individuals have a right to equally valuable initial opportunities to use natural resources. Although this is sensitive to initial chances of later brute luck events, it is not sensitive to whether these events occur. A different (but closely related)
view is the requirement that individuals have a right to equally valuable brute luck opportunities to use natural resources. (See Vallentyne 2002b for more on the difference between these two views.) On this view, gifts of natural resource that are a matter of brute luck (and not all are) do upset the relevant equality.
